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Research Questions
> Did populist party communication have an influence on a party’s       
visibility in the print media during the 2014 EP elections?
Are anti-immigrant types of populist party communication – i.e. excluding 
and nationalist populism – particularly successful in enhancing a party’s 
visibility in the print media?
Visibility in the media…
- enhances recognition and legitimacy (e.g. Ellinas 2010)
- helps mobilizing voter support (e.g. Koopmans & Muis 2009)
This study was supported by the German Research Foundation DFG under grant 
10017E and the Swiss National Science Foundation SNF under grant 144592/1. 
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> 3 components:
— alleged proximity to and 
identification with the population
appeal to the people
— criticism of and distrust                   
in the (political) elites 
elite-critique
— ostracism of ‚the others‘
exclusion
anti-elitist populism full populism
empty populism excluding populism
> Populism as a political communication style
(Jagers & Walgrave 2007)
Populism and Media Logic
> Journalists act as gatekeepers 
— base their selection on news factors to 
which they assign a certain news value 
(Galtung & Ruge 1965, Østgaard 1965)
> News factors 
— characteristics of news stories that 
contribute to making them newsworthy 
(e.g. Kepplinger 2008)
> Populism is said to be of high news value 
(e.g. Plasser & Ulram 2003, Mazzoleni 2003)
News Value of Populist Communication
ELEMENT OF POPULISM
-
NEWS FACTORS
(e.g. Schulz 1976; Staab 1990)
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Assumption
General Populism
> The more news factors a story satisfies, the higher the probability            
that it will be selected for publication.  
(Galtung & Ruge 1965)
> Populist messages carry a lot of news factors
Ⱦ they attract attention within the process of journalistic selection                       
and so do the parties that are communicating in this way!
H1:   A party is expected to become more visible in the news media 
the more often it applies a populist communication style.
Assumption
Excluding Populism
> The more news factors a story satisfies, the higher the probability            
that it will be selected for publication (additivity hypothesis). 
(Galtung & Ruge 1965)
H2:   A party is expected to become more visible in the news media if it     
applies a full populist communication style (i.e. with an exclusive 
element) rather than if it applies a populist communication style     
that is ‘only’ anti-elitist.
> transnational nature of the EU
— multi-level governance
Country (nationality)only
(nationality)
and European
European and
(nationality) European only total ‚European‘
DE 27% 59% 10% 2% 71%
AT 33% 55% 8% 2% 65%
FR 34% 57% 6% 1% 64%
GR 49% 47% 3% 2% 51%
own
nation
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> horizontal dimension: 
question of identity perception
> identities can be multi-layered
(e.g. Hermann & Brewer 2004)
> most of the people hold          
national identities
Q03: Do you see yourself as...
Source: Standard-Eurobarometer 81 – European Citizenship– Spring 2014  
Europeans
Assumption
Nationalist Populism
> national appeals reach large numbers of people
(e.g. Eurobarometer 2014)
> national appeals tap feelings of solidarity and identification
(e.g. Tarrow 1998)
Ⱦ ‘cultural proximity’ and ‘ethnocentrism’ are news factors with 
higher news value, if they involve national identification
H3:   A party is expected to become more visible in the news 
media if applies national populism than if it applies populist 
communication that refers to the community of Europeans. 
Austria, Germany, France, Greece
> quantitative content analysis of press releases
— all political parties that reached 
more than 3% in the last elections
— Europ* / europ* / EU and relevant acronyms (2x)
— 12 weeks prior to the 2014 EP elections
> 1 Greek, 3 German, 2 French coders
> 3 populism variables
— indices for degree, type and level 
of populism for each of the 27 parties
Procedure
Party Communication
elite 
critique
people 
reference exclusion
German French Greek
peopref 0.91 0.85 0.93
antiestab 0.76 0.76 0.73
exclusion 0.64 0.84 0.87
Krippendorff's α
German French Greek
political actor 1 0.73 0.62 0.78
political actor 2 0.73 0.92 0.82
political actor 3 0.62 0.83 0.58
Krippendorff's α
Procedure
Media Visibility
Austria, Germany, France, Greece
> quantitative content analysis of quality 
newspapers
— 12 weeks prior to the 2014 EP elections
— 1 right- and 1 left-leaning newspaper per country
— EU-related political news articles
— coded up to three political actors per article
that were expressing a political opinion
> 3 Greek, 8 German, 4 French coders
> ‘Visibility’
— party (exponent) expresses a political opinion 
within a news article at least once
Procedure
> linear OLS regressions
— percentage of a party‘s populist communication 
in press releases on its visibility in newspaper
> controlled for number of vote shares
Results I
N=27 parties; linear OLS regressions: numbers besides arrows indicate non-standardized regression coefficients; numbers near 
boxes indicate explained variances; all regressions have high values for VIF (<2.0), indicating that severe multicollinearity effects 
are not present; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
H1 ✓
populism
vote shares
0.0673**
visibility
.76
0.286***
visibility
full
vote shares
-0.033
0.234***
.63
visibility
anti-elite
vote shares
0.0695***
0.283***
.77
Dependent Variable
H2 ✗
Type of Populism
Results II
H1 ✓
N=27 parties; linear OLS regressions: numbers besides arrows indicate non-standardized regression coefficients; numbers near 
boxes indicate explained variances; all regressions have high values for VIF (<2.0), indicating that severe multicollinearity effects 
are not present; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
populism
vote shares
0.0673**
visibility
.76
0.286***
visibility
unspecific
vote shares
0.0644
0.257***
.64
visibility
nationalist
vote shares
0.0668***
0.259***
.75
Dependent VariableType of Populism
visibility
EU-oriented
vote shares
0.0109
0.237***
.63
H3 ✓
Conclusion and Outlook
> Were the media ‘secret helpers’ of the populists, because they granted 
them media attention as a result of their populist party communication? 
> Journalists do not only take into account the news factors of a message
— Political parallelism? Mediasystems?
— Mediatype?
— Country-differences? 
> Is visibility alone sufficient? 
> Apart from a party’s visibility in the news: are their actual populist 
messages reflected by the media too?  
Thank you!
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